As Dougherty notes, “One obvious branch that could have disrupted the German evacuation would have been an amphibious landing in Calabria, on the toe of Italy, behind Axis forces fleeing Sicily. Kesselring had no means of meeting such a threat and confessed, ‘A secondary attack on Calabria would have enabled the Sicily landing to be developed into an overwhelming Allied victory’. ” This misunderstanding essentially gave the retreating Axis forces to mobilize and evacuate with their resources to strengthen their defenses in the European mainland. And thus, inasmuch as understanding is a crucial element of a commander’s intent, its formation, its communication—faulty understandings of battlefield realities (of which there were many others), inhibited the manifestation of that intent in warfare operations …show more content…
After all, the ultimate decision to invade Sicily was contentious because different parties in the Allied forces having different understandings of the ultimate purpose of the war, or the strategy and tactics by which to achieve it. But coupled with this lack of shared understanding, few of the Allied commanders in Operation HUSKY had any experience in coordinating land, air, and sea operations . They did not understand how to best coordinate their decisions to effectively and efficiently succeed in HUSKY, wasting valuable time and resources or conceding some of the Allies advantages gained through their advance into Sicily; giving the Axis forces time to regroup and retreat with their